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1. Introduction
Understanding the determinants of the innovative
performance of firms is central to innovation and
entrepreneurship research. Yet, the development of
innovations by firms is not simply a matter of tech-
nical ability. Incentives matter as well. A classical
example is Arrow (1962), whereby larger firms have
lower incentives to innovate for fear of cannibalizing
existing products. Similarly, if a firm faces a larger
potential market or has established downstream com-
mercialization capabilities, it will have higher innova-
tion incentives. Therefore, in studying the drivers of
innovation performance, it is important to distinguish
between incentives and capabilities, as one may con-
found lack of incentives with lower technical capabil-
ities or vice versa.
A key contribution of this paper is to develop
and estimate a structural model that distinguishes
between these two dimensions. We use observations
on more than 3,000 drug research and development
(R&D) projects initiated between 1980 and 1994, and
followed through 2005. The pharmaceutical industry
is ideal for our analysis because the drug innovation
process follows well-defined steps (see, e.g., FDA
1999, DiMasi et al. 2003). New compounds are gen-
erated in the laboratory (initial discovery), tested on
animals (preclinical research), and if the firm consid-
ers them sufficiently promising, both technically and
economically, they are advanced into clinical trials
on humans. This process has two important regula-
tory gates: at the beginning of clinical trials, when an
investigational new drug application is filed, and at
the end of clinical trials, when a new drug application
may be filed. These two main stages play an impor-
tant role in our analysis.
We argue that firms do not advance all techni-
cally promising compounds to clinical trials; eco-
nomic considerations also affect this decision, creating
differences in selection behavior across firms. Thus,
if one measures innovation capability by the share of
preclinical compounds that eventually become new
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drugs, one may confound selection with capability
(e.g., Shaver 1998).
The contribution of this paper to the literature goes
beyond flagging a selection problem and develop-
ing a method to cope with it. We focus on two
questions that can be studied particularly well in
the context of the pharmaceutical industry. The first
is the long-standing comparison between the inno-
vation performance of large and small firms (e.g.,
Arrow 1983, Holmstrom 1989, Acs and Audretsch
1990, Henderson and Clark 1990, Chesbrough and
Teece 1996, Levinthal and March 1993). One view
holds that, whereas large firms have an advantage
in commercialization, small firms have more flexible
organizations that enhance creativity and attract more
inventive minds, which makes them more produc-
tive in R&D. A different view holds that economies
of scale and scope, and learning advantages, make
larger firms better at innovation (e.g., Henderson and
Cockburn 1996, Macher and Boerner 2006). In this
view, the comparative advantage of small firms may
lie in exploring technologies and markets that estab-
lished firms are unwilling to explore (Christensen
1997, Klepper and Thompson 2006, Giarratana 2004).
We cannot directly measure comparative advan-
tage. However, because older, established firms and
younger biotech firms each perform R&D, we can
examine if older and younger firms differ in their abil-
ity to develop compounds successfully. This is our
measure of innovation performance.
Our second question is whether markets for tech-
nology (Arora et al. 2001) are afflicted by a “lemons”
problem (Akerlof 1970). Are compounds offered for
license of lower quality than compounds developed
in-house? The current evidence is mixed. Danzon
et al. (2005) find that licensing has a positive effect
on the probability of success of drug compounds,
whereas Pisano (1997) and Guedj (2005) find that
licensed drugs are less successful than those devel-
oped in-house. Our paper tests these contending
views.
The next section reviews the main findings of the
empirical literature on drug development in the phar-
maceutical industry and places our contribution in
context. Section 3 describes the model, and §4 devel-
ops our hypotheses. Section 5 describes our data and
analysis. Section 6 discusses our estimates. Section 7
discusses the robustness of our results and concludes.
2. Innovation in Pharmaceuticals:
Related Literature
One group of studies on drug innovation focuses
on the internal economies of the firm (economies of
scale, scope, spillovers, experience). Henderson and
Cockburn (1996) study the determinants of research
(drug discovery) performance, measured by the num-
ber of important drug patents. They use data at the
level of the individual research program from the
internal records of 10 major pharmaceutical firms,
and find returns to scale at the level of both individ-
ual research programs and research expenditures of
the firm as a whole, as well as evidence of economies
of scope. Our paper investigates the stages after drug
discovery, as do most of the studies described below.
Nerkar and Roberts (2004) examine the determi-
nants of commercial success of new pharmaceutical
products. They find that proximal technological expe-
rience (patents in the same therapeutic class) has a
positive and significant effect on first-year sales of a
new product. Distal technological experience is posi-
tive and significant only when accompanied by a high
level of distal product-market experience. Finally,
they find that the interaction between distal and prox-
imal technological experience is negative, which sug-
gests that focused and diversified innovations may be
alternative strategies. Nerkar (2003) also studies the
relationship between experience and the probability
that a drug receives U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approval. He hypothesizes that experience
may not lead to better performance if the experi-
ence is of the wrong sort (e.g., oriented toward drug
discovery rather than drug development), and if feed-
back is inadequate or delayed. With drug develop-
ment cycles stretching to 10 years or more, researchers
may be rewarded for discovery (measured by patent-
ing) rather than commercialization (measured by FDA
approval). As a result, scientists may continue to work
in areas that provide them with clumps of patents but
do not lead to commercially useful drugs. As we dis-
cuss below, even small firms may suffer from a mis-
alignment of incentives, as reflected in their selection
behavior.
A second group of studies looks specifically into
the drug development process by examining projects
in clinical trials. Adams and Brantner (2003) and
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) analyze drugs in clini-
cal trials around the world between 1989 and 2002.
They find that success rates and durations can vary
substantially across observable characteristics of the
drugs, including primary indication, originating com-
pany, route of administration, and chemistry. Macher
and Boerner (2006) also estimate time to complete
clinical trials, but by looking at contract research orga-
nizations rather than integrated R&D projects in phar-
maceutical firms. They find that scale and scope
economies, and experience, are valuable.
Danzon et al. (2005) focus on the role of experience
(both overall experience and experience in a partic-
ular therapeutic category) and alliances on the out-
come of R&D projects. Their sample consists of R&D
projects from more than 900 firms during 1988–2000.
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They too find evidence of large, positive returns to
a firm’s overall experience in the larger and more
complex late-stage trials. They recognize, but do not
explicitly model, differences across firms in the qual-
ity of their drug candidates.
Our paper shares the approach and goals of these
papers. However, none of them explicitly address
the concern that firms may systematically vary in
how selective they are in advancing compounds into
clinical trials. As is well known, clinical trials are
much more expensive than preclinical trials, particu-
larly late-stage clinical trials. Which compounds make
it into clinical trials depends on whether managers
think the compounds are promising. All else being
equal, compounds with a higher likelihood of FDA
approval are more likely to be advanced into clini-
cal trials than compounds with a lower probability of
success.
Commercial considerations are also very impor-
tant. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) present evidence
that larger pharmaceutical markets see more inno-
vation. Furthermore, a firm with downstream mar-
keting capabilities in a particular market (such as
Bristol-Myers Squibb in anticancer or Merck in car-
diovascular) may be able to extract greater value
from a drug than a firm that lacks such capabili-
ties, and may therefore be willing to take a chance
on a compound with a lower likelihood of success.
Other considerations may also be important. A drug
championed by a high-status research team may be
selected for clinical trials even if it is below threshold
(Nerkar 2003). Guedj and Scharfstein (2005) point to
the agency problem between managers and investors.
In biotech startups, managers typically have one or
two compounds to bet on, and therefore try to push
them into clinical trials. By contrast, larger firms have
many compounds from which to choose and are less
likely to have a vested interest in any particular com-
pound. As a result, biotech companies are more likely
to advance products from phase I into phase II clini-
cal trials, but these compounds are more likely to fail
in later stages (Guedj and Scharfstein 2005). In our
paper, we distinguish between preclinical and clinical
trials, but do not separately analyze progress across
the various clinical stages.
To appreciate further the contribution of our paper,
it may be useful to compare it with Chandy et al.
(2006), who examine the “conversion ability” of firms
in translating drug-related patents into new drugs.
They find that conversion ability is greatest in firms
that develop an intermediate number of drug-related
patents. Because firms patent compounds soon after
discovery, Chandy et al. (2006), in essence, study the
success rate of preclinical compounds. Our analysis
“unpacks” this sequence into whether a compound is
selected into clinical trials, and if selected, whether
it successfully receives FDA approval, and models
the drivers of the underlying processes. This enables
us to move away from the assumption implicit in
Chandy et al. (2006) that firms attempt to convert
every compound. Instead, our model allows the strin-
gency of selection to be driven by the expected prof-
itability of the market, the scale and scope of the firm,
and other technology, market, and firm characteris-
tics, ensuring that the rate at which preclinical com-
pounds succeed is determined not only by the factors
that drive innovation performance but also by the fac-
tors that drive selection into clinical trials. In econo-
metric terms, what allows us to identify selection is
that the major resource commitments are made in
clinical trials rather than in preclinical trials (DiMasi
et al. 2003), so that we can assume that commercial
considerations affect selection, but do not affect the
outcome once a compound is into clinical trials.
Finally, the literature addresses the question of
whether licensed compounds are more likely to suc-
ceed compared to in-house projects. The market-for-
technology perspective (Arora et al. 2001) suggests
that smaller, technology-specialist firms and estab-
lished manufacturers have comparative advantages in
different stages of the innovation process. In partic-
ular, technology specialists are relatively more effec-
tive in upstream innovation activities, which rely
on creativity, rather than in downstream develop-
ment and commercialization, which is intensive in
resources and scale. Licensing permits the technology
specialists to “cooperate” with downstream incum-
bents, increasing overall efficiency. Zeckhauser (1996)
and Pisano (1997, 2006) argue that technology mar-
kets are inefficient and are potentially afflicted by
a lemons problem. Pisano (1997) finds that in-house
development is superior to licensed compounds, and
Guedj (2005) finds that projects financed by pharma-
ceutical companies but developed by biotech firms are
more likely to fail. On the other hand, Danzon et al.
(2005) find that compounds developed in alliances
(roughly equivalent to licensed compounds) have a
lower probability of failure in clinical trials. Note that
Danzon et al. (2005) include in their sample alliances
formed prior to the conclusion of each phase (up
to phase III). Because these alliances are likely to
include marketing agreements, which pharmaceuti-
cal firms often strike for successful compounds to
enhance market access, there is the potential for an
upward-biased estimate. To avoid this problem, we
follow Guedj (2005) and only include licenses signed
before phase I clinicals, and test whether licensed
compounds differ from in-house compounds. How-
ever, comparing compounds discovered by biotech
firms and licensed to pharmaceutical firms to com-
pounds discovered in-house by pharmaceutical firms
is not the correct way to test for a lemons problem.
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A lemons problem would exist if firms systematically
licensed inferior drugs and kept superior ones in-
house. Thus, we estimate whether licensed com-
pounds are drawn from a different distribution than
those that firms develop in-house.
3. An Econometric Model of Selection
and Success
To understand the interplay between selection and
success, we provide a simple model. After a com-
pound has been discovered, the firm starts preclini-
cal trials to evaluate its properties. Preclinical research
will provide the firm with an estimate of the proba-
bility that the compound will succeed, i.e., pass clin-
ical trials and receive FDA approval. Let Pg be the
firm’s (unbiased) point estimate of the (uncertain)
probability of success of a particular compound. We
will sometimes refer to this as the quality of the
compound. Formally, Pgi, the probability that com-
pound i of firm j will pass clinical trials, is a random
variable drawn from a distribution with a firm spe-
cific mean, j (the innovative capability of the firm).1
Actual success or failure is only observed for com-
pounds selected for clinical trials.
3.1. Drug Selection
Dropping the subscripts for compound and firm to
avoid clutter, let V indicate the expected net addi-
tional revenue if the compound is eventually mar-
keted, and let D indicate the net additional clinical
trial costs, which we label development costs. The
firm will take the compound into clinical trials if
it expects a net profit from its development, i.e., if
PgV − D > 0 or Pg > D/V . We denote D/V as Pg∗,
a threshold that is a function of V and D. Note that
Pg∗ is not a random variable but rather a threshold
value. The probability of a compound being selected
depends on both the threshold, Pg∗, and the “qual-
ity” of the compound, Pg, where the latter is itself a
random variable. Thus, the average probability that a
compound is selected depends on Pg∗ and .
The selection threshold, Pg∗, represents the eco-
nomic and strategic dimensions of selection. For
instance, firms with full pipelines of drugs under
development will assess a higher net addition to
development costs (D), and hence, have a high Pg∗.
Market profitability matters as well. To anticipate our
empirical analysis, competition in the product mar-
ket will reduce the expected value, V , implying a
higher Pg∗. Similarly, larger markets will increase V ,
implying a lower Pg∗. Also, public firms may have a
lower cost of capital, implying a lower D, and hence,
a lower Pg∗.
1 In the empirical analysis,  will also differ by therapeutic area
(indication).
We assume that once a compound enters clinical tri-
als, its future progress in clinical trials is determined
only by its technical characteristics. Our interviews
with industry executives suggest that over the course
of development, the relative importance of technical
characteristics increases. Early in drug development,
the selection threshold is influenced by commercial
considerations such as the size of the market, the
extent of competition in the market, and the firm’s rel-
evant commercialization capabilities. Technical (ther-
apeutic) characteristics gain influence as a compound
progresses through trials, and its safety, effectiveness,
and potential side effects become apparent. We sim-
plify by assuming that technical promise, Pg, and
commercial considerations, represented by Pg∗, both
determine selection. However, once selected, the FDA
approval takes place with probability Pg. Because
we do not observe Pg, the expected probability of
FDA approval is the expected value of Pg, conditional
upon Pg being greater than Pg∗.2
3.2. Drug Development
Let Y1 = 1 if the compound is selected for clinical tri-
als, 0 otherwise. Therefore the probability of selection
is PrY1 = 1 = PrPg > Pg∗. Let Y2 = 1 if the project
succeeds if selected for trial, and 0 if it fails in clini-
cals, so that PrY2 = 1= EPg  Pg > Pg∗. To estimate
the model, we assume that the log of the odds ratio,
lnPg/1− Pg, is normally distributed with mean 
and unit variance. Furthermore, we assume that 
depends linearly on a set of independent variables Z,
i.e.,  = Z. The threshold Pg∗ is assumed to be a
function of a set of independent variables X. Because
Pg∗ must be between 0 and 1, we assume Pg∗ =
expX/1+expX so that lnPg∗/1−Pg∗=X.












PrY1=1 and Y2= (1)
where the four terms represent, respectively, not
selected, selected but failed, selected and succeeded,
and selected and still in trial (log of probabilities is
considered). Note that we have two binary dependent
variables, and we are estimating the drivers of Pg∗
and , rather than the more typical exercise of esti-
mating the probability of selection and the probability
2 A different model would start with some projects being “good”
and others “bad,” with a real valued signal, Pg, about whether the
project is good. Instead, we consider each project to be like a coin
toss, with the probability of success (“heads”) equal to Pg. The firm
observes Pg and then decides whether it wants to toss the coin.
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whereas the probability of success is
PrY2 = 1  Y1 = 1
= EPg  Pg > Pg∗=
∫ 1
Pg∗






Danzon et al. (2005) effectively estimate PrY2 = 1 
Y1 = 1). Although they acknowledge the selection
issue by including the share of projects selected from
preclinicals in that indication as a regressor, they can-
not separately identify  and . Nerkar (2003) and
Chandy et al. (2006) estimate PrY1 = 1 and Y2 = 1≡
PrY2 = 1  Y1 = 1PrY1 = 1. All else being equal,
as a firm becomes more selective (the second term
decreases), the compounds it advances into clinicals
will be more likely to succeed (the first term increases),
but the product of the two, the share of compounds
in preclinicals that eventually succeed, may either
fall or rise. Without modeling both PrY2 = 1  Y1 = 1
and PrY1 = 1, and without explicitly recognizing
the interdependence between them, one cannot distin-
guish innovativeness (i.e., ) across firms.
4. Hypothesis Development
4.1. Selection Hypotheses
Our first set of hypotheses is about selection. We
define a firm to be more selective if Pg∗ is higher.
Broadly, selection reflects the cost of development and
the expected profit given a successful drug. These
must be distinguished from factors that condition the
likelihood of success—the drivers of .
We hypothesize that there are program-level
economies of scale. For example, a company with
long-standing arrangements with academic hospitals
for trials in an indication will find it easier to develop
another compound within that indication than in oth-
ers, implying a lower development cost, D. Similarly,
links with prescribing physicians in a therapeutic area
will increase sales of an approved drug, increasing
profits, implying a higher V . In both cases, Pg∗ will be
lower. Adding more programs or increasing the scale
of other programs are unlikely to lower the develop-
ment and clinical trial costs of a molecule or allow
the firm to extract more profit from it if approved.
Firm scale and scope will condition the likelihood of
success, as we argue later. Accordingly, though we
include measures of firm scale and scope as controls,
we do not hypothesize how they condition Pg∗. For-
mally, we have the following:
Hypothesis 1. Research scale at the level of the pro-
gram makes the firm less selective (lower Pg∗).
The pharmaceutical industry has two fundamen-
tally different types of firms: the established pharma-
ceutical producers and the biotechnology companies.
The established firms were founded early in the
20th century, if not earlier. A large gap separates
the entry of the pharmaceutical firms and the first
biotech company, Genentech, in 1976. Syntex, the
youngest research-based U.S. pharmaceutical com-
pany before Genentech, was founded in 1958. Waves
of biotech companies have entered after Genentech.
Their main driver has been research, and the compar-
ative advantages and specialization of these firms are
clearly upstream compared to the drug manufacturers
(Gambardella 1995). Such differences in origin, time
of entry, and development underlie profound differ-
ences between these two company types.
For example, Arrow (1962) suggests that the fear
of cannibalizing profits from existing markets and
products leads an incumbent firm to underinvest in
research. In established firms, new compounds are
more likely to cannibalize existing products. By con-
trast, most biotech firms have no products on the mar-
ket and have little to fear about cannibalization of
existing products. Insofar as one cannot fully control
for this effect in the empirical analysis, the cannibal-
ization effect is an important reason to distinguish
between different firm types. Difficult-to-measure dif-
ferences in organizational capabilities are another
reason to distinguish between biotech and pharma-
ceutical firms. Interviews with managers reveal that
pharmaceutical firms have well-established routines
and financial models for deciding how compounds
are moved along through the various stages of pre-
clinical and clinical research. By contrast, many of
the smaller entrants lack such discipline, and the
founders may have strong biases that favor com-
pounds being selected. The need to provide “good
news” to investors may also bias startups to push
drugs into clinical trials (Guedj and Scharfstein 2005).
In addition, there may be differences in risk aver-
sion. Ordinarily, one might imagine that large, estab-
lished firms would be less risk averse. However, as
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed in a seminal paper,
limited liability laws may make startups more risk
loving, particularly in taking large risks that might
result in bankruptcy. The intuition is simple. A large
risk (“swinging for the fences”) has high reward but
also a high cost in terms of bankruptcy. With few
assets to protect, and with outside equity investors
frequently having a large share of the capital at risk
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if the project (and the firm) fails, managers of small
biotech firms may be inclined to swing for the fences,
which implies that they would have a lower Pg∗.
Indeed, using patent citation analysis, Owen-Smith
and Powell (2006) find that biotech firms in the Bay
Area, which has a greater involvement of venture cap-
italist firms, are more likely to initiate riskier projects
than biotech firms in the Boston region, where uni-
versities (and National Institutes of Health funding)
are more heavily represented. Interviews with R&D
executives support the idea that biotech firms tend to
push compounds into clinical development that firms
with bigger product portfolios might hold back. When
asked, the managers also believe that biotech firms
are more inclined to swing for the fences.
Among the biotech firms themselves, there are dis-
tinctions to be made. Some of the oldest biotech firms
that survive today, such as Genentech and Amgen,
have become similar to the established drug compa-
nies. They have products in the market and they have
to manage cannibalization. They have strong financial
models for selecting projects, and also considerable
wealth at risk from an expensive failure. This suggests
that the Pg∗ of the older biotech firms lies somewhere
between that of established pharmaceutical firms and
that of the smaller, more recent biotech entrants.3 We
can then formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Even after controlling for the scale and
scope of research, established pharmaceutical companies are
more selective (higher Pg∗) than biotech firms. The older
and more established biotech firms are more selective than
the younger biotech firms.
4.2. Performance Hypotheses
Note that whereas Hypothesis 1 relates to how scale
affects development costs and profits from successful
compounds, here we focus on how scale and scope
affect the probability of success, roughly analogous
to the difference between incentives and innovation
capabilities.
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) identify three
types of economies in research: economies of scale
at the level of the research program; economies of
scale at the level of the firm; and economies of
scope across research programs of the firm (see also
Macher and Boerner 2006, Nerkar and Roberts 2004).
There are a variety of sources of scale and scope
economies. A larger firm with a diverse research port-
folio may enjoy knowledge spillovers (Henderson and
Cockburn 1996); may have a larger chemical library
3 Clearly, selection effects are at work here as well. Biotech firms
that entered early and survived are more efficient, reinforcing the
argument that they have become more similar to the established
companies.
(Thomke and Kuemmerle 2002); may be more knowl-
edgeable about the underlying biochemical processes;
may have better models for interpreting results from
animal and small sample human studies; or may be
better able to modify the lead compound to improve
efficacy and reduce side effects.
These benefits may be offset by organizations that
are maladapted, with perverse incentives and inad-
equate feedbacks (e.g., Nerkar 2003). There is, how-
ever, another reason why measures of program-level
economies may appear to result in lower . A firm
with a number of compounds in trial for the same
indication is unlikely to commercialize all of them,
even if they could all win approval. Instead, the firm
will pick the most promising among them. Though
our formal model assumes that once selected, com-
pounds progress through clinical trials based entirely
on technical merits, this is a simplification. In real-
ity, firms may choose to bring a number of promising
compounds into trial for an indication, but pick only
the best, terminating the rest (Dahan and Mendelson
2001). The cannibalization effect may work similarly.
A firm with a product may choose not to commercial-
ize a drug that is safe and effective but very similar
in its target market to the existing product. Put differ-
ently, the portfolio and cannibalization effects do not
reduce , but instead result in an estimated  that is
lower than the true .
Hypothesis 3. The innovation performance of a firm in
a given research area increases with (a) the overall research
scale of the firm, (b) the span of the research across research
areas (scope), and (c) research scale at the level of the pro-
gram. The portfolio and cannibalization effects reduce the
measured innovation performance.
As with selection, there are other differences be-
tween established firms and biotech companies that
may affect performance. There is a substantial lit-
erature arguing that smaller research-intensive com-
panies are more creative than established firms. For
example, smaller firms are said to have a more
open environment, enhancing benefits from exter-
nal knowledge (e.g., Chesbrough 2003), and are less
prone to asymmetric information between managers
and inventors inside the organization (Arrow 1983,
Holmstrom 1989). Conversely, internal bureaucracies
inside large firms may crush good ideas. Also, larger
firms may tend to rest on one’s laurels (Christensen
1997), and they may stress exploitation over explo-
ration (Levinthal and March 1993).
However, an alternative hypothesis has the oppo-
site prediction. The agency model in Guedj and
Scharfstein (2005), and the idea that small biotech
firms may have excessive incentives for risk, implies
that biotech firms would advance even inferior com-
pounds into clinicals. In our model, this implies a
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lower estimated  for biotech firms. Ultimately, the net
effect of these two forces is an empirical matter. We
then formulate two alternative hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4. Biotech companies have higher innova-
tion performance than established pharmaceutical firms
because smaller organizations are more innovative.
Hypothesis 4′. Biotech firms have lower innovation
performance because of misaligned incentives.
4.3. Licensing Hypotheses
If the licensing agreement does not share costs and
benefits in the same proportion across the licensee
and licensor, this will bias the selection threshold.
In the extreme case, if the licensee is responsible for
the cost of development but has to pay a royalty
from sales of a successful compound to the licen-
sor, this effectively reduces V for the licensee, imply-
ing a lower Pg∗. However, knowing this, partners try
to align incentives by sharing costs and benefits. We
do not observe details of the licensing contracts, and
accordingly, we do not formulate a hypothesis regard-
ing the effect of licensing on Pg∗.
Regarding the performance of licensed compounds,
following Akerlof (1970), the economics literature
predicts that markets for knowledge are character-
ized by information asymmetries about the quality of
the technology offered for license (Zeckhauser 1996).
Although these arguments are typically used to sup-
port the contention that licensing is not the preferred
mode of commercialization, they can be extended to
performance, as Pisano (1997) does in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The notion is that a licensor is likely
to keep its most promising technologies for its own
use and only offer inferior ones for license. Licensees
therefore believe that compounds offered for licens-
ing are on average worse than compounds not offered
for license, conditional on observable characteristics.
If so, the licensees must be offered a discount. But
then the suppliers of good compounds are less likely
to offer their compounds for license, thereby fulfilling
the belief about compounds offered for license being
inferior. If so, licensed compounds will be drawn from
an inferior distribution (lower ) than those retained
for in-house development. Guedj (2005) also offers
an asymmetric-information-based model that implies
that licensed compounds not only have a lower Pg∗
but also have a lower probability of success. He finds
empirical support in a sample of projects selected for
clinicals.
There are countervailing arguments suggesting that
the market for lemons is not an important problem in
technology markets. Arora and Gambardella (1994),
building on the insights of Cohen and Levinthal
(1989) and Rosenberg (1990), argue that research capa-
bilities also provide firms with the ability to evaluate
external technologies. Licensees in the drug industry
are typically firms that perform research themselves,
so that potential buyers are capable of evaluating the
technical characteristics of the licensed compound,
especially since strong patent protection in this indus-
try facilitates the disclosure of relevant information.
Furthermore, many licensing transactions are embed-
ded in strategic research partnerships and involve
minority investments or codevelopment deals, reduc-
ing potential information asymmetries. Of course,
a potential licensor may suppress unfavorable test
results or may not carefully probe avenues that might
lead to uncomfortable findings. Therefore, the poten-
tial for asymmetric information and, consequently,
for a lemons problem, always exists. Accordingly, we
state the following:
Hypothesis 5 (Market for Lemons). Licensed com-
pounds exhibit lower innovation performance than inter-
nally developed compounds.
5. Data
Our sample is drawn from the PHID (Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry Database) developed by the CERM Foun-
dation, which combines proprietary data sets on the
pharmaceutical industry. It reports information about
more than 17,000 R&D projects all over the world
carried on since the 1980s.4 Following Danzon et al.
(2005), we consider each indication for which the
compound is being developed as a separate project.
Also, countries have different institutions and proce-
dures for advancing compounds to clinical trials and
for approving them for sales. Even in our database,
both the selection and success rates of European tri-
als are higher than the United States, which suggests
that the U.S. criteria are more stringent. To reduce
this source of heterogeneity, we focus on U.S. trials.
Our sample is composed of all projects with preclini-
cal research conducted in the United States (whether
by U.S. firms or not). We classify as “selected” those
projects that start clinical I in the United Staes,
and analogously for successful projects.5 We exclude
projects originated by hospitals, public sector labs, or
universities, where selection processes may be differ-
ent. We reduce the censoring problem posed by ongo-
ing projects that are neither successes nor failures by
including only those projects that entered preclinical
4 Names of firms in the database are reported as they were in 2002.
Therefore, we cannot consider separately the projects of firms that
merged or were acquired during the 1990s.
5 There are a few cases with missing information about the location
of preclinical research, which we dealt with case by case, using
other contextual information in the database.
Arora et al.: Firm Type, Scale, Scope, and Selection Effects in Drug Development
Management Science 55(10), pp. 1638–1653, © 2009 INFORMS 1645
trials between 1980 and 1994.6 Our final sample is
composed of 3,311 projects, with 329 distinct firms
and 185 indications.7
We divide biotech firms into two types, depend-
ing on whether they were founded before or after
1988, the median founding year for the biotech firms
in our sample. We also distinguish between the
top pharmaceutical corporations worldwide (hence-
forth “Established Pharma”), and smaller pharma-
ceutical firms developing compounds that target
predominantly infection and inflammation, asthma
and diabetes, obesity, and sexual dysfunctions (hence-
forth “Other Pharma”), which are typically much less
R&D-intensive. Specifically, we distinguish among
four types of companies:
(i) Pioneer Biotech: Firms that apply biotechnologi-
cal methods to the discovery and development of new
drugs and were founded before 1988.
(ii) Other Biotech: All other firms using biotechnol-
ogy for the discovery of new drugs.
(iii) Established Pharma: Pharmaceutical firms
among the top 50 firms worldwide by sales for
at least 10 years during the 15-year period 1983–1998
(excluding biotech firms and adjusting for mergers
and missing data for 1995).
(iv) Other Pharma: All other pharmaceutical firms.
Table 1 reports the number of firms and projects
related to the four types of firms considered in the
analysis. Our empirical measures are summarized in
Table 2. Measures that vary across firms and indi-
cations are noted as measured at the project level,
whereas others vary only across firms, or only across
indications.8 Table 2 also shows the predicted sign of
6 Following Danzon et al. (2005), we classify as failures projects
that remain in a phase, without any further reported events, for
longer than the maximum number of years observed for com-
pletion of each phase in the noncensored sample. The maximum
number of years is computed within each indication. When this is
not practicable—due to missing observation for the indication—we
consider the maximum over all the indications.
7 By selecting trials started between 1980 and 1994, the sample
reduces to 8,107 observations, of which 7,247 were started by phar-
maceutical and biotechnology firms. We further exclude projects
codeveloped by two or more institutions, leaving us with 6,659
observations. By focusing only on preclinical research projects
undertaken in the United States and projects with identifiable out-
comes, we end up with 3,311 observations.
8 We use two complementary classification systems for identify-
ing the relevant therapeutic market: namely, indication in standard
term and the anatomical therapeutic classification (ATC). Indica-
tion refers to the target disease or clinical condition, focusing on
the clinical symptoms for which the drug is being tested, whereas
the ATC deals with the therapy, using anatomy as the main orga-
nizing theme. At the first ATC digit, compounds are grouped
according to the organ or system on which they act, whereas
at the second digit, classes are formed on the basis of pharma-
cological/therapeutic action. For example, class D comprises all
dermatological compounds, with class D10 grouping all antiacne
Table 1 Firm Types and R&D Projects
Number of Number of
Firm type projects (%) different firms (%)
Pioneer Biotech 1031 (31.14) 123 (37.39)
Other Biotech 556 (16.79) 101 (30.70)
Established Pharma 1512 (45.67) 31 (9.42)
Other Pharma 212 (6.40) 74 (22.49)
Total 3311 (100) 329 (100)
the variable. Some variables are excluded from  (and
the corresponding cell is left blank), whereas other
variables are used as controls (and the corresponding
cell has a check () mark, rather than a plus (+) or
minus (−) symbol).
Scale and Scope: We measure Scale_program, or the
scale at the program level, as the cumulative num-
ber of past projects for that indication. Scale_firm, or
scale at the level of the firm, is measured by the total
number of ongoing projects in all indications. Scope
is measured by the Herfindahl index of diversifica-
tion of projects across indications, for the firm. These
measures are based on the literature. Danzon et al.
(2005) and Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) use the num-
ber of drugs in development to measure overall firm
scale. To measure program-level economies, Macher
and Boerner (2006) use the number of projects com-
pleted and Danzon et al. (2005) use the total num-
ber of projects in the therapeutic area. Finally, Danzon
et al. (2005) use the same Herfindahl-index-based
measure that we use, and Macher and Boerner (2006)
use the number of therapeutic areas in which the firm
is active to measure scope economies. Henderson and
Cockburn (1996) use the concentration of R&D expen-
ditures, which we cannot do because we lack R&D
data at the program level.
Licensed Compounds: The database records the licen-
sor and licensee(s).9 We consider a project “licensed”
only if the agreement was signed in preclinicals.
Controls: We develop binary, indication-level mea-
sures10 to show (a) whether the disease is lethal
(lethal), (b) whether it can result in organ damage or
complications (organ damage), (c) whether the disease
is chronic or acute (chronic), (d) whether the disease
preparations. The corresponding indication is “acne.” Class A refers
to compounds targeted to the alimentary tract and metabolism,
with diabetes drugs classified in class A10. The corresponding indi-
cation is “diabetes.”
9 Where multiple licensees were present, we assigned the develop-
ment of the project to the largest U.S. firm, and manually verified
that the firm was in charge of development.
10 The main source for the disease information is Braunwald et al.
(2001). Other information comes from e-medicine reviews from
http://www.diseasedatabase.com. For diffusion data, we use the
“rare disease database” cited by the FDA, and available at http://
rarediseases.about.com/cs/orphandrugs/a/122103.htm.
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Table 2 Variables Definitions
Pg∗  Variable Measured as Measured at the level of
− + Scale_program Number of projects already started by
the firm for that indication
Project
 + Scale_firm Total number of projects by the firm Firm
 + Scope Herfindahl index of firm’s projects
across indications
Firm
 − Licensed compound If the compound is licensed in
preclinical
Project
  Closeness to science Share of projects jointly developed
with a public research organization
for that indication
Project
  Presence in ATC2
product market
Equals 1 if firm has a product in the
ATC2 class, equals 0 otherwise
Project
− Public Equals 1 if firm is public when the
project is started
Firm
− Market size Worldwide sales in the ATC2 class Indication
+ Market competition 1. Log of the number of firms with a
product in the ATC2 class
Indication
2. Share of established pharma with
a product in the ATC2 class
  Disease characteristics Lethal, organ damage, multi-causal,
chronic, rare, first-in-class (see
text)
Indication
has multiple causes (multiple causes),11 and (e) whether
the disease targeted is rare (rare).12 We also use a
dummy variable indicating whether the firm already
has a product in the same market, as defined by the
anatomical therapeutic classification at the 2nd digit
(ATC2), to proxy for the firm’s downstream assets
and experience in that market.13 These variables are
used to control for differences across indications in
the likelihood of success, , as well as differences in
profitability and cost of clinical trials, which condi-
tion Pg∗, the selection threshold.
Finally, because pharmaceutical and biotech firms
may choose projects with different levels of inno-
vativeness or risk, we devise a proxy for the level
of innovativeness (and therefore of risk) associated
with the project. We determine if the compound is
first in class or a follower molecule (first-in-class).14
All else being equal, we expect first-in-class com-
pounds to exhibit a lower selection threshold. This is
because there are fewer available alternatives, making
11 Multiple causes equals 1 if the etiology is multifactorial and
equals 0 if it is unknown or single factor.
12 An orphan or rare disease affects fewer than 200,000 individuals
in the United States. The “Orphan Drug Act” (1983) allows drug
companies to take tax deductions for about three-quarters of the
cost of the clinical studies (FDA 1999), with an implied reduction
of cost for development.
13 We also tried the total number of molecules in the same ATC2
with no change in the results.
14 We use the chemical name of the projects and its CAS (Chemical
Abstract Service) registry number (when available) to distinguish
me-too and second-generation molecules from first-in-class com-
pounds (see Reddy 2003).
it easier to improve upon existing remedies. We also
expect first-in-class compounds to be drawn from an
inferior distribution because there is less information
about potential side effects. Unfortunately, in almost
40% of cases it is impossible to classify the molecule
under study because its chemical characteristics are
not available. To properly distinguish first-in-class
compounds from followers, we create an indicator
variable, first-in-class unknown, for when this informa-
tion is missing. Through the use of these fine-grained
controls at the level of indication, we can avoid using
indication-fixed effects, which can bias nonlinear esti-
mates, a possibility confirmed by (unreported) Monte
Carlo simulations.
Economic Characteristics of Therapeutic Area: We use
information on the worldwide sales (at the ATC2
level) in the year the project is started as a proxy
for V .15 We measure the degree of competition by the
number of firms operating in that indication (world-
wide) at the time the project is launched. We also
employ the share of established pharmaceutical firms
as an additional control for the intensity of competi-
tion. We use the share of projects developed with uni-
versities as a measure of the firm’s links with research
institutes, and its closeness to science (closeness to
science). These are hypothesized to affect only Pg∗,
because they affect the profitability of a project rather
than its likelihood of success.
Specification and Identification of Pg∗ and : The
system of equations we estimate is nonlinear. We
15 We use 1983 figures for projects started in 1980–1982 as well,
because data for those years are missing.
Arora et al.: Firm Type, Scale, Scope, and Selection Effects in Drug Development
Management Science 55(10), pp. 1638–1653, © 2009 INFORMS 1647
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Variable Mean SD Min Max
Selection 048 050 0 1 Closeness to science 005 016 0 1
Success 034 048 0 1 Public firm 084 037 0 1
Pioneer Biotech 031 046 0 1 Market size 238 247 0 1440
Established Pharma 046 050 0 1 Competitors (log) 309 102 0 523
Other Biotech 017 037 0 1 Share of established 028 018 0 1
pharma in market
Other Pharma 006 024 0 1 First-in-class 030 046 0 1
Scale_project 267 353 0 31 First-in-class unknown 039 049 0 1
Scale_firm 3623 4619 0 586 Lethal 075 043 0 1
Scope 083 021 0 0.98 Organ damage 078 042 0 1
Presence in ATC2 018 039 0 1 Multiple causes 080 040 0 1
product market
License 008 027 0 1 Chronic 079 040 0 1
preclinical only Rare 004 020 0 1
also impose three exclusion restrictions. We assume
that the economic characteristics of the compound—
i.e., the size of the market, the level of competition
in the market, and whether the firm is private or
public—only affect the selection threshold and not
the distribution of the probability of success. This is
how we identify selection (Pg∗) as opposed to per-
formance (). Second, recall that we normalize the
variance of lnPg/1− Pg to unity. We do allow for
interdependence across the observations for a firm by
clustering standard errors at the firm level.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. It shows
that about half the projects were selected for clinical
trial, and of those, roughly one third were success-
ful. Reflecting the dominance of established firms (see
Table 1), Table 3 shows that, on average, a project was
associated with over 2.5 projects in the same indica-
tion, and 8% of projects were licensed in preclinicals.
6. Empirical Results
Table 4 presents simple probit estimates of the selec-
tion and success equations estimated separately. Com-
pared to established pharmaceutical firms, biotech
firms have a lower probability of selection and a
lower probability of success, though the difference
is not statistically significant. Firm scale increases
the probability of success (though it leaves the
selection probability unchanged), whereas program
scale decreases both selection and success probability.
Scope reduces selection but increases success. Projects
for more profitable markets (larger size and lower
competition) have higher probability of selection and
success. The presence of downstream assets (a prod-
uct already in the market) makes selection more likely
but reduces success.
It is tempting to try to interpret these results in
terms of the various theories about differences across
firms or firm scale and scope. However, as we dis-
cussed in developing our model, the probability of
success will also depend on the selection thresh-
old, and vice versa. For instance, is scope associated
with higher success because it is associated with
lower selection probability? If so, should not program
scale (associated with lower success probability) have
been associated with greater selection probability?
The results in Table 4 are difficult to reconcile with a
simple Heckman-selection model, in which the same
underlying process drives both selection and success.
In other words, we need to estimate the structural
parameters of the full model described in §3, where
we jointly model selection decisions and performance.
Table 5 reports the results of pseudomaximum likeli-
hood obtained using STATA. Note that Table 4 reports
the drivers of the probability of selection and success,
and Table 5 reports the drivers of the selection thresh-
old and the innovative performance. For instance,
the coefficients reported under probability of selec-
tion in Table 4 are − , whereas Table 5 reports 
(see §3). We estimate two specifications. In one, we
use firm-type dummies (Established Pharma is the ref-
erence group) and disease controls only, whereas in
the second we also include measures of scale and
scope, and firm and market controls.
6.1. Selection Results
We find that research scale at the program level re-
duces the selection threshold consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1. However, firm scale and scope increase the
selection threshold. Other Biotech and Other Pharma
exhibit, respectively, a lower and a higher threshold
than the Established Pharma. Other Pharma may have
higher development costs than Established Pharma,
perhaps because the former lack the strong links
with reputed academic centers enjoyed by established
pharmaceutical firms such as Lilly and Merck; they
may also have limited production and marketing
assets. By contrast, there is little difference in the
selection process between Pioneer Biotech and Estab-
lished Pharma. However, the coefficient of the Other
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Table 4 Probit Estimates: Factors Affecting Selection (Pr Selection), and Factors Affecting Success for Selected Projects (Pr Success)
Model 1 Model 2
Pr selection Pr success Pr selection Pr success
Pioneer Biotech −031∗∗ (0.11) −022 (0.15) −037∗∗ (0.12) −008 (0.17)
Other Biotech −047∗∗ (0.13) −079∗∗ (0.36) −054∗∗ (0.16) −063 (0.41)
Other Pharma −018 (0.17) 053∗∗ (0.20) −033 (0.21) 078∗∗ (0.26)
License (preclinical) 003 (0.15) 014 (0.28) −006 (0.14) −002 (0.27)
Scale_program −009∗∗ (0.02) −014∗∗ (0.03)
Scale_firm −0.1E−4 (0.1E−2) 001∗∗ (0.2E−2)
Scope −047∗∗ (0.19) 054† (0.32)
Closeness to science 059∗∗ (0.25) 0.4E−2 (0.23)
Presence in ATC2 class 029∗∗ (0.12) −030∗∗ (0.12)
Public 017 (0.11) 004 (0.20)
Competitors (log) −014∗∗ (0.04) −015∗∗ (0.07)
% Established pharma competitors 036 (0.22) 018 (0.24)
Market size 002 (0.02) 010∗∗ (0.02)
Lethal 007 (0.09) −013 (0.14) −002 (0.09) −021 (0.15)
Organ damage −017∗∗ (0.08) 013 (0.09) −015† (0.08) 009 (0.11)
Multiple causes −012 (0.08) −020† (0.11) −002 (0.08) −013 (0.11)
Chronic 002 (0.07) −013 (0.15) 0.3E−2 (0.07) −004 (0.15)
Rare −012 (0.15) 073∗∗ (0.20) −011 (0.14) 058∗∗ (0.17)
First-in-class −036∗∗ (0.10) −020 (0.15) −035∗∗ (0.09) −017 (0.15)
First-in-class unknown −147∗∗ (0.09) −154∗∗ (0.24) −139∗∗ (0.09) −159∗∗ (0.20)
Constant 097∗∗ (0.14) 009 (0.21) 169∗∗ (0.24) −024 (0.42)
No. of observations 3,311 1,088 3,311 1,088
Log-likelihood −1,849.98 −616.08 −1,752.67 −578.12
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms).
∗∗p < 5%; †p < 10%.
Biotech dummy is sizable (ranging from −1.25 to
−1.15), implying that younger biotech firms have
lower selection thresholds than older ones, consis-
tent with theories about greater risk profiles, agency
problems, and weaker management models. Nonethe-
less, p-values of the tests comparing Pioneer Biotech
and Other Biotech provide only marginal support to
Hypothesis 2.16
Among the measures of profitability, the number
of competitors increases Pg∗, implying lower prof-
itability. Similarly, previous commercial experience in
the ATC2 class reduces Pg∗, which suggests higher
economic value from successful compounds in mar-
kets where the firm has commercialization capability.
Market size also increases profitability, but the esti-
mated coefficient, though negative, is not statistically
significant.
6.2. Performance Results
Table 5 shows that program scale reduces  but
firm scale increases it. The effect of scope is posi-
tive, but imprecisely measured. Thus, Hypothesis 3
is only partially supported. If we believe that there
16 We tested the null hypothesis that the two selection thresh-
olds are equal, against the alternative hypothesis that Pg∗Other
Biotech < Pg∗Pioneer Biotech. The z-statistics for the test equal 1.33
in Model 1 and 1.34 in Model 2. In both cases, the p-value is approx-
imately 0.09.
are significant program-level economies of scale, then
our measure is confounding economies of scale with
the portfolio effect. Consistently, we find that if a
firm has a product in the market,  is lower, which
is surprising if one believes that past experience
should improve innovative performance. The alter-
native explanation appeals to the portfolio effect. To
ensure that its downstream assets are fully utilized, a
firm with downstream assets in a market will develop
many compounds in clinical trials for the therapeutic
target (e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez 2006, Dahan and
Mendelson 2001), resulting in lower estimated Pg∗.
However, the firm will commercialize at most one
of the compounds, even if more could gain FDA
approval. The higher “failure” when there are more
projects under development for the same indication
reflects such portfolio effects.
Table 5 shows that both Pioneer Biotech and Other
Biotech have lower , implying that they have
lower innovative performance compared to Estab-
lished Pharma. Formally, Hypothesis 4 is rejected in
favor of the alternative Hypothesis 4′. Table 5 also
shows that Pioneer Biotech perform better than Other
Biotech, even after controlling for scale, scope, and
downstream assets.17 There are three interpretations,
which are not mutually exclusive. The first is that
17 The p-values of the test statistic for a one tail test is 0.060 in
Model 1 and 0.057 in Model 2.
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Table 5 Structural Model, Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Model 1 Model 2
Pg∗  Pg∗ 
Pioneer Biotech −026 (0.32) −056† (0.31) −016 (0.31) −055† (0.29)
Other Biotech −125† (0.71) −172∗∗ (0.70) −115 (0.73) −171∗∗ (0.72)
Other Pharma 104∗∗ (0.40) 086∗∗ (0.42) 137∗∗ (0.28) 102∗∗ (0.36)
License (in preclinical) 024 (0.41) 027 (0.45) 013 (0.38) 008 (0.42)
Scale_program −020∗∗ (0.04) −029∗∗ (0.04)
Scale_firm 001∗∗ (0.6E−4) 001∗∗ (0.1E−2)
Scope 111∗∗ (0.53) 062 (0.54)
Closeness to science −020 (0.26) 039 (0.30)
Presence in ATC2 class −071∗∗ (0.21) −042∗∗ (0.18)
Public −017 (0.11)
Competitors (log) 013∗∗ (0.04)
% Established pharma competitors −030 (0.21)
Market size −001 (0.02)
Lethal −026 (0.25) −019 (0.24) −004 (0.20) −004 (0.21)
Organ damage 031† (0.17) 014 (0.17) 038† (0.20) 023 (0.18)
Multiple causes −030 (0.22) −042∗∗ (0.18) −030† (0.18) −032∗∗ (0.15)
Chronic −023 (0.27) −020 (0.28) 005 (0.23) 007 (0.24)
Rare 134∗∗ (0.30) 122∗∗ (0.33) 106∗∗ (0.22) 094∗∗ (0.26)
First-in-class −019 (0.29) −054† (0.28) −020 (0.28) −054∗∗ (0.26)
First-in-class unknown −232∗∗ (0.54) −379∗∗ (0.58) −239∗∗ (0.51) −378∗∗ (0.54)
Constant −107∗∗ (0.38) −010 (0.37) −251∗∗ (0.57) −082 (0.55)
No. of observations 3,311 3,311
Log-likelihood −2,466.54 −2,345.18
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms).
∗∗p < 5%; †p < 10%.
biotech firms are in fact less innovative than estab-
lished pharmaceutical firms. The second is that
biotech firms advance into clinical trials less promis-
ing compounds because their managers have perverse
incentives, or because they are incapable of correctly
evaluating the potential of the compound, or because
they are willing to take more risk. The third inter-
pretation is that the regulatory hurdles for the aver-
age biotechnology product are more difficult to meet
than those for the average pharmaceutical product,
and our controls do not adequately control for these
differences.
6.3. Licensing Results
Recall that the lemons hypothesis is based on the
seller systematically offering a lower-quality good,
keeping the superior-quality good for internal use.
This implies that licensed compounds should have
a lower  than compounds developed in-house by
the licensor. Table 5 shows that we do not observe
any market for lemons. Licensed compounds face a
higher selection threshold, Pg∗, as might be expected
if the licensee has to share revenues (but not costs)
with the licensor. However, they also have a higher ,
although neither coefficient is statistically significant.
Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported. The countervail-
ing effects discussed in §3 appear strong enough to
avoid a lemons problem.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
A key takeaway from our analysis is that in compar-
ing the innovation performance of firms, one must
pay careful attention to differences in behavior, and
to factors, such as incentives, that may drive such dif-
ferences. We explicitly model one aspect of behavior,
namely, the decision to select a compound into clinical
trials. However, there are other aspects of our results
that illustrate the same point, such as our finding no
program-level economies of scale, or that a firm with
past experience in a market (and that, by inference,
has downstream assets) is less successful in inno-
vating in the market. These apparently anomalous
findings can be reconciled by considering the incen-
tives of firms to ensure the full utilization of down-
stream assets by selecting a number of compounds
into clinical trials, at most one of which is marketed,
thereby reducing estimated innovative performance.
The problem lies with the measure of program-level
economies of scale (commonly used in the literature),
which confounds the economies of scale with the
portfolio effect.
Our results imply that even after controlling for
scale and scope of the firm, there are significant differ-
ences across different types of firms. These differences
reflect both performance and behavior, most notably,
selection. The different results in Tables 4 and 5 sug-
gest that explicitly modeling selection is important. To
Arora et al.: Firm Type, Scale, Scope, and Selection Effects in Drug Development
1650 Management Science 55(10), pp. 1638–1653, © 2009 INFORMS
see this, compare the results about the firm type dum-
mies for specification 2 in the two tables. In Table 4,
the dummies for Pioneer Biotech and Other Biotech are
negative and significant in the selection equation, but
in the success equation, the estimates are insignifi-
cant. Table 5 shows that they have significantly lower
 but also lower Pg∗. Thus, we conclude that the
reason biotech firms are less likely to advance com-
pounds into clinical is because on average they have
lower-quality compounds compared to average phar-
maceutical firms, not because biotech firms are more
selective.
7.1. Robustness Checks
We conduct a series of tests to explore the robust-
ness of our results to changes in the sample, alterna-
tive measures of market profitability, and alternative
assumptions about the distribution of Pg. For brevity,
we summarize our results, with details available
from the authors upon request. First, our results
are largely unchanged if we expand our sample to
include projects initiated in Europe, or by universi-
ties and other public research organizations. Similarly,
defining an established pharmaceutical firm to be one
that appears on the list of the top 50 pharmaceu-
tical firms by sales for 3, 5, or 10 years does not
materially change our results. Second, although the
nonlinear specification of our likelihood function con-
tributes to identification, our results do not depend on
it. We also estimate a specification where the log-odds
ratio of Pg is uniformly distributed over some sub-
set of the unit interval, with little qualitative change
in our results. Finally, our results are robust to some
alternative empirical measures. For instance, using
the Herfindahl index of market shares in an indica-
tion (for the year 2001) to measure competition in the
market leads to similar results. Dropping first-in-class,
for which there are many missing values, does not
change our results. Similarly, using sales at the ATC3
level in an indication (albeit for a single year, 2001) to
measure market size does not affect our findings.
To validate our estimation results, we also com-
pared our estimated Pg∗, which corresponds to the
ratio of development costs and expected revenues,
with estimates of costs and revenues provided by
the existing literature (DiMasi et al. 2003, OTA 1993,
Grabowski et al. 2002). The estimates of Pg∗ obtained
from these calculations range from 0.07 to 0.19, com-
pared to our estimated value of 0.12, which is very
close to the median.18
7.2. Further Explorations
Because we estimate structural parameters, we can
use them for “what-if” scenarios to provide additional
18 Details of these calculations are available upon request.
Table 6 Estimated Selection and Success Probabilities, Selection
Threshold (Pg∗), and Average Performance (), by
Originator Type
Originator type Pr selection Pr success Pg∗ 
Overall 048 025 012 −287
Pioneer Biotech 044 019 011 −297
Established Pharma 057 027 013 −235
Other Biotech 030 007 003 −479
Other Pharma 055 043 031 −104
insights into the implications of our estimates. We
begin by using the estimated coefficients from specifi-
cation 2 in Table 5 to compute the probability of selec-
tion, the unconditional probability of success, and the
value of Pg∗ and  for the firm types in our sample
(Table 6).
Figures 1 and 2 show the simulated distributions
of Pg for the whole sample and by originator types,
using our estimates from specification 2 in Table 5.
The distribution of Pg is skewed, with a low num-
ber of highly successful projects and a high number
of projects with low probability of success. In general,
the right tails of the four distributions become fatter
as we move from the Other Biotech to Pioneer Biotech,
Established Pharma, and Other Pharma. Using the esti-
mated coefficients of specification 2 in Table 5, we also
perform some simulation exercises. We first study the
effects of changes in firm size.
Table 7 reports the estimated effects of a one-
standard-deviation increase in Scale_ firm. When
Scale_ firm increases, Pg∗ increases. Because  also in-
creases, the probability of selection increases too. Inter-
estingly, the effects of the firm research scale are rather
small. Thus, although Scale_firm is statistically signifi-
cant in both the selection and performance equations
in Table 5, its overall effect is small relative to the
Figure 1 Estimated Distribution of Pg
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
(%)
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Figure 2 Estimated Distribution of Pg, by Originator Type






impact of firm type. As discussed, we believe these
firm types reflect different organization structures and
strategic behavior. Our empirical results suggest these
differences are important for understanding differ-
ences in innovation performance.
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
Our results are from the pharmaceutical sector. This
sector is extraordinarily research intensive, and its
innovation process over the last three decades has
been transformed, with a much greater role for genet-
ics and molecular biology. These transformations
have opened up opportunity for entry. Thus, it is a
good test bed for exploring differences in innovation
capability between incumbents and entrants. Even so,
we focus on only one part of the innovation pro-
cess, drug development, and arguably the part most
favorable to incumbents. A fuller analysis, which also
incorporates the more-upstream research and discov-
ery process, is left for further research.
Another avenue for additional research has to do
with differences in risk aversion. We discussed the
impact of risk aversion on the selection process. How-
ever, such differences may also be a source of unob-
served heterogeneity in conditioning other outcomes.
We assume that market size, measures of compe-
tition, the presence of downstream assets, whether
Table 7 Simulating an Increase in the Research Scale of the Firm
Scale_Firm
Pioneer Biotech Established Pharma Other Biotech Other Pharma
Baseline +1  Baseline +1  Baseline +1  Baseline +1 
Pr selection 044 044 057 057 030 030 055 055
Pr success 015 015 022 023 004 004 038 039
Pg∗ 011 011 013 013 003 003 031 031
 −297 −295 −235 −233 −479 −477 −104 −101
or not the molecule is first-in-class, as well as the
other disease characteristics such as lethality, acute-
ness, and multiplicity of causes, together control for
differences in the potential net revenues. However,
it is possible that incumbents show superior perfor-
mance by trying to hit singles while entrants are
swinging for the fences. In economic terms, entrants
are willing to take bets with smaller probabilities of
success but much higher rewards if successful. By
contrast, incumbents have more financial reserves,
making them reluctant to bet heavily on a partic-
ular project. From a societal perspective, this is an
efficient division of labor. Society enjoys the benefits
of experimentation by entrants without unduly risk-
ing the valuable capabilities in research, development,
and marketing of the established incumbents. Though
plausible and consistent with our results, this story
is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, which
holds that even the incumbent pharmaceutical firms
are focusing on blockbusters. We leave this issue for
further research. One implication of these results is
that the division of innovative labor (Arora et al. 2001)
in the pharmaceutical industry must rely on differ-
ences in comparative (rather than absolute) advantage
across biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms. Alter-
natively, the advantage of biotech firms may lie in
researching unexplored avenues, rather than in doing
better what pharmaceutical firms already do.
Our results on licensed compounds point to the
benefits of the division of labor between entrants and
incumbents. From an econometric viewpoint, we treat
licensing as exogenous, because estimating a separate
licensing equation (to account for potential endo-
geneity) will require much more detail about poten-
tial licensors and licensees than we currently have.
The available evidence suggests projects that are out-
licensed and those that are retained in-house appear
to be drawn from similar distributions. This suggests
that endogeneity is unlikely, but we cannot be more
definitive at this stage.
An extension of our analysis would be to explic-
itly model the portfolio effect. A firm with multiple
projects for the same indication will likely commer-
cialize the most promising and abandon others, even
perhaps some that could have successfully passed
clinical trials. In our estimation, we cluster the errors
at the level of the firm, but are unable to cluster
at the firm-cum-indication level. As a result, such
interactions may be captured through our measures
of scale and scope, leading to potentially confound-
ing results. Future research may explicitly model
how a firm chooses among the portfolio of com-
pounds in clinical trials for a particular indication,
and how this choice varies with whether it has rele-
vant downstream assets, and with potential for prod-
uct cannibalization.
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Despite these limitations, our paper makes two
important contributions. It provides a simple model
wherein firms choose which compounds to advance
into clinical trials, taking into account the technical
promise of the compound, as well as economic and
commercial considerations. The model also specifies
how the observed innovation performance is condi-
tioned by this choice. Our second contribution is to
analyze the factors driving this choice, and in particu-
lar, how differences in the underlying innovativeness
between established firms and entrants, as well as dif-
ferences across them in incentives to advance com-
pounds to trials, drive both their behavior and their
innovation performance.
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